

**Monetary Policy, Risk-Taking and Pricing:
Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment**

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Abstract

We analyze the impact of monetary policy rates on loan risk-taking and pricing. An excellent setting for identification is Bolivia between 1999 and 2003, where the US federal funds rate is the appropriate measure of monetary policy and exogenous to Bolivian economic conditions. We find robust evidence that a decrease in the funds rate spurs the granting of new loans: (1) with a higher probability of default, (2) to non-performing or lowly rated borrowers, (3) at a lower interest rate spread, and (4) especially by banks with more agency problems, suggesting a link from low policy rates to excessive risk-taking.

Keywords: monetary policy, low short-term interest rates, softening lending standards, credit risk, liquidity risk, subprime borrowers, bank agency problems, duration analysis.

JEL: E44, G21, L14.

“The root cause of this credit correction was the Federal Reserve's willingness to keep money too easy for too long. The federal funds rate was probably negative in real terms for close to two years between 2003 and 2005. This led to a misallocation of capital.”

“The Bernanke Call – II,” Review & Outlook, Editorial, *The Wall Street Journal*, August 11th, 2007

“A rate cut does not just increase the supply of cash; it directly influences people’s calculations about risk. Cheaper money makes other assets look more attractive.”

Monetary Policy — Hazardous times, Leaders, Opinion, *The Economist*, August 23rd, 2007

I. Introduction

The crisis in the credit markets started in August 2007 and has continued almost unabated until today. Many observers have argued that during the long period of very low levels of monetary policy rates that preceded the crisis, banks softened their lending standards, but may have failed to price the extra risks they took.¹ In this paper, we empirically analyze whether the level of the monetary policy rates affects bank loan risk-taking and pricing.

Analyzing the impact of short-term rates on risk-taking involves in general two major identification challenges. First, the monetary policy rate is often endogenous to economic conditions and – in particular – is low when risks are high. Second, changes in the demand for loans need to be disentangled from the changes in the supply of loans. Consequently, exogenous monetary policy and exhaustive information on loans, banks and borrowers are needed to understand if and how policy rates affect banks’ risk-taking.

¹ Between 2001 and 2005 nominal short-term interest rates were the lowest in almost four decades and below Taylor rates in many countries, while real rates were negative (see Taylor (2007) and Ahrend, Cournède and Price (2008)). Rajan (2005), Taylor (2008), Borio and Zhu (2008), Allen (2009), Blanchard (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Calomiris (2009), and Diamond and Rajan (2009), among others, and numerous contributions in *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Financial Times* and *The Economist* conjecture that very low short-term interest rates may result in excessive risk-taking. Adrian and Shin (2009), Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud and Shin (2009), and Shin (2009) discuss the importance of overnight rates for bank liquidity and leverage, affecting in turn risk-taking by banks. Short-term interest rates also affect the pricing of equity (Rigobon and Sack (2004), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)), bonds (Manganelli and Wolswijk (2007)) and buyouts (Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg and Weisbach (2007)).

Bolivia during the period 1999 to 2003 provides us with an excellent – almost experimental – setting to identify the impact of the monetary policy rate on loan risk-taking and pricing. During this period Bolivia’s banking system was almost fully dollarized, its currency followed a crawling peg with the US dollar, and there were hardly any restrictions in its capital account. But its small economy was not synchronized with the US economy. Consequently, changes in the US federal funds rate, which are exogenously transmitted into the Bolivian markets, provide us with exogenous variations in monetary policy rates.

The Bolivian credit register contains very detailed contract information at a monthly frequency on *all* bank loans granted to firms in Bolivia. Matched with bank balance sheet information and key firm characteristics such as identity, industry, level of debt, credit rating and borrower credit history, the register allows us to study bank loan risk-taking eliminating alternative hypotheses. We analyze many different loan-specific measures of loan risk-taking that fit into three categories: (1) the time to individual loan defaults, (2) the likelihood of granting loans to borrowers with observable past or current non-performance or weak internal credit ratings at origination, and (3) the pricing of credit risk.

We find robust evidence that a lower federal funds rate wets banks’ risk-appetite: banks grant new loans with a higher hazard rate, engage less credit-worthy borrowers, and charge lower loan spreads. In particular, controlling for bank, firm, relationship, loan, market, macroeconomic and country-risk characteristics, we observe that a decrease in the US federal funds rate prior to loan origination: (1) leads to the origination of more loans with a higher probability of default (in pointed contrast, a decrease in the federal funds rate over the life of the loan lowers the hazard rate of outstanding loans); (2) increases the likelihood that loans are granted to observably riskier borrowers with current or past non-performance or to borrowers with a subprime credit rating; and (3) is associated with a lower price per unit of risk, suggesting that this extra risk-taking is supply (and not demand) driven.

We also document that, when the federal funds rate is low, banks with more liquid assets and fewer funds from foreign financial institutions take more risk. Larger banks and banks with a lower capital ratio or a higher ratio of non-performing loans also tend to take more risks when the federal funds rate is low. The additional risk that is taken is priced even more negatively by these banks than by the other banks. The effect of a low monetary policy rate on risk-taking is therefore stronger for banks more prone to agency problems,² suggesting that low short-term interest rates may create excessive risk-taking.

Our paper makes two contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, this paper and Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2008) are the first papers to concurrently investigate the impact of monetary policy on bank *risk-taking*.³ Compared to Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró

² Similar to the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen (1986)), more *liquidity* exacerbates agency problems between the banks, their debt-holders, the supervisors, and the deposit insurance scheme because of the resulting flexibility to alter risk (Myers and Rajan (1998)). *Foreign depositors*, who are large, more sophisticated, and not covered by the domestic deposit insurance scheme, may be better able and have more incentives to monitor bank managers and limit moral hazard. Larger banks are more likely to be viewed as too-big-to-fail and thus are more subject to potential bailout policies that increase agency problems. Low levels of *bank capital*, by giving less “skin in the game” for example, also sharpens agency problems (see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Freixas and Rochet (2008) for reviews). Our findings, therefore, link higher loan risk-taking in an environment with low short-term interest rates to more severe agency problems in banks (Allen and Gale (2007)) further increasing confidence that our empirical testing strategy identifies supply effects.

³ The impact of monetary policy on the aggregate volume of credit in the economy has been widely analyzed. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for example reviews the literature dealing with the general *credit channel*, while Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap and Stein (2000) focus on the *bank lending channel*. Within the *(firm) balance sheet channel* lower short-term interest rates improve borrowers’ net worth and entice banks to grant loans to borrowers of lower quality in the past (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)) or with fewer pledgeable assets (Matsuyama (2007)). But lower interest rates may push financiers beyond this category of redeemed borrowers to finance firms and projects that are actually riskier in the present (Borio and Zhu (2008)). Indeed, lower interest rates may reduce the threat of deposit withdrawals (Diamond and Rajan (2006)), abate adverse selection problems in credit markets (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006)), or improve banks’ net worth (Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Geanakoplos (2009), and Shin (2009)), in turn increasing bank risk-taking. Low levels of short-term interest rates may further lead to a search-for-yield (Rajan (2005)) or in conjunction with agency problems at the bank level induce banks to take on too much risk (Allen and Gale (2007), Calomiris (2009)). Moreover, current low short-term rates may signal low short-term rates in the near future, thus further increasing loan risk-taking by banks (Diamond and Rajan (2009)). In addition, lower risk-less rates increase the attractiveness of risky assets for all investors, including banks. For example in a mean-variance portfolio framework or in models including habit formation in which investors become less risk-averse during economic expansions because their consumption increases relative to their normal levels (Campbell and Cochrane (1999))) a softening of monetary policy decreases the investors’ degree of risk aversion by increasing real economic activity. On the other hand, lower short-term interest rates decrease the opportunity costs for banks to hold cash (Smith (2002)) or increase the banks’ net worth or charter value thus reducing risk-taking in general and “gambling for resurrection” in particular (Kane (1989) and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000)). Ultimately, the impact of short-term interest rates on risk-taking is a mostly unaddressed empirical question.

and Saurina (2008), this paper employs better measures of *ex ante* risk-taking in an even more appropriate Mundell-Fleming setting. Using the Spanish credit register Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2008), on the other hand, employ a much longer time period which covers at least one complete business cycle. Although the two papers draw from two entirely different financial systems in terms of development and economic conditions, results are very similar – making it less likely that the findings in either paper are simply picking-up some uncontrolled peculiarity of either system.

Second, our paper also analyses banks' *risk-pricing* and, in this way, takes identification a step further. We find that the extra risk that is taken when short-term interest rates are low is negatively priced, suggesting that this risk-taking is supply (rather than demand) driven. We also find that banks with more agency problems price this extra risk even less sharply, linking low monetary policy rates and risk-taking with moral hazard problems at the bank level, suggesting a possible link from low policy rates to excessive risk-taking.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes our empirical strategy in more detail. Section III models the time to default of individual bank loans and introduces the variables employed in the empirical specifications. Section IV presents the results. Section V summarizes the results and concludes.

II. Empirical Strategy

To econometrically identify changes in the banks' appetite for risk ideally we would like to have: (i) variation in short-term interest rates that is not driven by local economic conditions; (ii) all bank loan applications (accepted or not) with detailed information on each of them, including loan rates. In this ideal setting a simple regression would identify the impact of short-term interest rates on the banks' appetite for risk. We think this ideal setting does not

exist. However, Bolivia offers the closest setting – that we know of – to this ideal econometric environment. In this section we explain why.

During the sample period the Bolivian peso was pegged to the US dollar and the banking sector was almost completely dollarized. More than 90 percent of deposits and credits were in US dollars, which made Bolivia one of the most dollarized economies among those that have stopped short of full dollarization. The exchange rate regime, the absence of restrictions on movements in the capital account and the dollarization imply that the federal funds rate is the proper measure of monetary policy rates in Bolivia. In fact, during the sample period the correlation between the US federal funds rate and other short-term interest rates in Bolivia is very high, suggesting that changes in the US monetary policy rates are transmitted into the Bolivian markets. For example, the correlation coefficients between the US federal funds rate and the rates on savings deposits, T-Bills, and interbank loans are equal to 0.92, 0.88 and 0.74 respectively. Instead, the correlation between the US federal funds rate and measures of economic activity in Bolivia is negligible (i.e., the correlation coefficient equals -0.14).⁴

Our main data source is the *Central de Información de Riesgos Crediticios* (CIRC), the public credit registry of Bolivia. The database is managed by the Bolivian Superintendent and all banks are required to participate. It contains detailed information, on a monthly basis, on *all* outstanding loans granted by any bank operating in the country. The Register was first employed by Ioannidou and Ongena (2009). We have access to information from 1999 to 2003. For each loan we have detailed *contract* information (e.g., date of initiation, maturity, amount, interest rate, rating, currency denomination, value of collateral, type of loan, etc.),

information about the *borrower* (e.g., identity, region, industry, legal status, number and scope of relationships, total bank debt, the borrower’s credit history, etc.), as well as information on *ex post performance* (e.g., for each month, we know whether and when a loan has overdue payments and whether it defaults). We complement this dataset with *bank* characteristics (e.g., size, capital ratios, non-performing loans, liquid assets, and foreign financing) from publicly available bank balance sheet and income statements.

The richness of the Register allows us to construct several, complementary, measures of bank risk-taking. Within the framework of a fully specified duration model we use the time to default as a dynamic measure of risk that allows us to disentangle the differential effects of monetary policy on *new* and *outstanding* loans. In particular, we analyze the determinants of the hazard rate in each period, i.e., the probability that a loan defaults in period t , conditional on surviving until period t . We define default (the event of interest) to occur when the bank downgrades a loan to the default status (a rating of five) and estimate how the monetary policy rate – at initiation *and* during the “life” of the loan – affects the probability of default in each period.⁵ Controlling for other factors that affect probability of default during the life of the loan, the effect of short-term interest rates at initiation on *ex post* non-performance is attributed to risk-taking (i.e., the origination of riskier loans).

One concern about using *ex post* performance to estimate *ex ante* risk-taking could be that banks did not intend to take these risks but were just caught off guard during difficult times. In the duration models we include controls that vary over the life of the loan to account for

⁴ By way of comparison, the correlation coefficient between the US federal funds rate and the US growth rate of real GDP is instead positive and equal to 0.34, as the Federal Reserve typically raises its monetary policy rate when the growth rate GDP is higher (Taylor (1993)).

⁵ Small loans are downgraded to five if there are overdue payments for at least a certain period of time (91 days for collateralized loans and 121 days for loans that are not collateralized). Large loans, instead, are downgraded to five when the borrower is considered insolvent (i.e., borrowers’ net worth is close to zero).

this, but the possibility of omitted variables remains. Hence, to further address any remaining concerns we also use *ex ante* measures of risk that were directly available to banks when making their loan decisions (e.g., their own internal ratings on the borrowers' repayment capacity and the borrowers' credit history) and examine whether the short-term interest rates affect the probability of initiating new loans to borrowers with a subprime rating and observable credit history problems (i.e., past and current delinquencies and defaults).

The next step in our empirical strategy consists in exploiting the cross-sectional implications of recent theory regarding the sensitivity of bank risk-taking to monetary policy according to the strength of banks' balance sheets (Diamond and Rajan (2006), Diamond and Rajan (2009)) and moral hazard problems (Rajan (2006), Allen and Gale (2007)). Hence, we include interactions between the federal funds rates and key bank characteristics.

The final step of our empirical investigation is to study loan pricing in order to further identify whether the observed increases in riskier loans are supply-driven. If bad borrowers demand more loans when rates are low,⁶ and more loans flow to these subprime borrowers, then loans should exhibit higher hazard rates and risk premiums should increase (i.e., *ceteris paribus*, if the demand for risk increases, the price per unit of risk should also increase). However, if the increase in riskier loans is supply-driven (i.e., it is the banks that are willing to take more risk, and not the bad borrowers that seek more credit), the price per unit of risk should drop, and it should drop more for banks with more moral hazard problems.

Throughout our empirical investigation we report basic and parsimonious models. But the results are robust to many alterations. For example we assess various functional forms for

⁶ In Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) the demand for funds from risky borrowers increases when interest rates are higher. The empirical evidence on this account seems mixed (Berger and Udell (1992)).

our specifications, employ the US federal funds rate as instrument for the Bolivian interbank rate (instead of using the federal funds rate directly in the specifications), include more macro controls such as additional country risk measures, cross-border financial linkages, the Bolivian peso – US dollar exchange rate, and various other short-term or long-term interest rates and spreads. Finally, we also study the sub-period stability of our findings. We discuss these and other robustness checks in more detail when reporting our results.

III. Model and Variables

A. Duration Model

We analyze the time to default of an individual loan as a measure of its risk.⁷ The same methodology is also employed in Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2008) making the results of the two studies comparable. The estimates from this analysis are then used to investigate pricing.

Let T represent the duration of time that passes before the loan defaults. This passage of time is often referred to as a spell. Repayment prevents us from ever observing a default on the loan, right-censoring the spell. We will return to this issue later in this section.

The hazard function, $\lambda(t)$, determines the probability that default will occur at time t , conditional on the spell surviving until time t , and is defined by:

$$\lambda(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{P(t \leq T < t + \Delta t | T \geq t)}{\Delta t} = \frac{-d \log S(t)}{dt} = \frac{f(t)}{S(t)}, \quad (1)$$

⁷ As in McDonald and Van de Gucht (1999) for example. Heckman and Singer (1984), Kiefer (1988), Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002), Greene (2003) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005) provide comprehensive treatments of duration analysis. Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007) discuss and employ empirical bankruptcy models.

where $f(t)$ is the density function associated with the distribution of spells. The hazard function summarizes the relationship between the length of a spell and the likelihood of default. Hence, the hazard rate provides us effectively with a *per-period* measure of risk.

When estimating hazard functions, it is econometrically convenient to assume a proportional hazard specification, such that:

$$\lambda(t, X(t), \beta) = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{P(t \leq T < t + \Delta t | T \geq t, X(t), \beta)}{\Delta t} = \lambda_0(t) \exp(\beta' X_t), \quad (2)$$

where X_t is a set of observable, possibly time-varying explanatory variables, β is a vector of unknown parameters measuring the impact of the explanatory variables on the probability of default in period t , conditional on surviving until then, $\lambda_0(t)$ is the baseline hazard function and $\exp(\beta' X_t)$ is chosen because it is non-negative and yields an appealing interpretation for the coefficients. The logarithm of $\lambda(t, X(t), \beta)$ is linear in X_t . Therefore, β reflects the partial impact of each variable X on the log of the estimated hazard rate.

The baseline hazard $\lambda_0(t)$ determines the shape of the hazard function with respect to time. The Weibull specification assumes that $\lambda_0(t) = \lambda \alpha t^{\alpha-1}$. The Weibull baseline hazard allows for duration dependence. If the hazard rate exhibits positive (negative) duration dependence, then $\hat{\alpha} > 1$ ($\hat{\alpha} < 1$). Instead, if the hazard rate is constant over time, $\hat{\alpha} = 1$. $\lambda_0(t)$ is estimated using maximum likelihood.

Censoring is a very important issue when estimating a duration model. With no adjustment to account for censoring, maximum likelihood estimation of the proportional hazard models produces biased and inconsistent estimates of model parameters. Accounting for right-censored observations can be accomplished by expressing the log-likelihood function as a

weighted average of the sample density of completed duration spells and the survivor function of uncompleted spells (see Kiefer (1988)).⁸

In this context, we also note that relying on the probability of individual loan default, which is assessed in standard probit or logit models, could actually lead to fallacious inferences in case maturity changes. Indeed, the probability of an individual loan default does not uniformly correspond to the probability of default in each period (the hazard rate) on which we will rely to gauge bank risk-taking and pricing. Nevertheless, for robustness we also assess the impact of monetary policy rates on loan default using a probit model. Despite the apparent shortening of maturity over the monetary cycle, our results remain similar.

As mentioned earlier, apart from analyzing the impact of interest rates prior to loan origination on the time to default, we also analyze the impact of monetary policy rates on *ex ante* proxies of risk-taking that are based on internal credit scores and lending standards. In particular, employing a probit model we examine whether the probability of initiating loans with subprime ratings or loans to borrowers with bad credit histories (i.e., prior defaults or current delinquencies) is higher when interest rates are low.

⁸ Controlling for left-censoring is less straightforward (Heckman and Singer (1984)); hence, in economic duration analysis is often ignored. However, we start our sample in 1999:03 and study only the new loans granted since then, effectively removing the left censoring problem. As the actual time to repayment is typically very short, around half a year, the reduction in sample size is very small.

B. Variables

1. *Dependent Variable and Timing of the Independent Variables*

The dependent variable in the hazard model is the time to default or repayment. As reported in Table 1 the average time to default or repayment is six months, but varies between one and 52 months. The hazard rate has an intuitive interpretation as the probability of default in period t , conditional on surviving until period t . It is our main proxy for risk-taking.

[Insert Table 1 here]

Suppose a loan l is granted in month τ , where τ indicates calendar time. We denote as T the time to default in case of a downgrade to the default status or the time to maturity in case of repayment. Hence, either default or repayment occurs in month $\tau + T$. We differentiate between the monetary policy rate in the month prior to the loan origination, $\tau - 1$, and the policy rates during the life of the loan (i.e., from τ to $\tau + T$). In time-varying duration models all months between τ and $\tau + T - 1$ contribute to the estimation (i.e., the fact that a loan survives until a given period is used when estimating the parameters of the duration model). This information is lost when estimating a probit model. We index these periods with $\tau + t$, where $t: 0 \rightarrow T - 1$. Figure 1 clarifies further the timing of the variables within the context of a time-varying duration model.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

2. *Monetary Policy Conditions*

To measure monetary policy conditions we use the monthly average of the nominal US federal funds rate. We label the monetary policy measure prior to loan origination as *Federal Funds* _{$\tau-1$} and the measure over the life of the loan as *Federal Funds* _{$\tau+t$} . During the

sample period the US federal funds rate averaged around 4.25%, but varied substantially throughout (see Figure 2). During an initial period of monetary policy tightening, the rate climbed from 4.75% in March 1999 to 6.5% in May 2000. The rate remained at this plateau of 6.5% until October 2000, followed by a steep decline during a period of monetary expansion to 1.75% in December 2001 and to 1% by December 2003. As mentioned earlier, this variation in the US federal funds rate was transmitted to Bolivia. For example, the rate on US dollar denominated savings deposits, the rate on the 3-month, US dollar denominated, Bolivian Treasury Bills, and the interbank rates follow a similar pattern (see Figure 2).⁹

[Insert Figure 2 here]

3. *Bank, Firm and Relationship Characteristics*

In addition to the measures of monetary policy conditions, an array of bank, firm, relationship, loan, market and macroeconomic controls are included in the specifications. Table 1 defines all the variables employed in the empirical specifications and provides their mean, standard deviation, minimum, median and maximum values.

Bank characteristics are all taken in the month prior to the loan origination. As a measure of bank size we use the log of total bank assets in millions of US dollars, $\text{Log}(\text{Assets})_{t-1}$. Better possibilities for diversification or “too big to fail” perceptions (Boyd and Runkle (1993)) for example may entice large banks to initiate riskier loans. The median bank granting loans recorded in the register has around 625 million US dollar in assets.¹⁰

⁹ The spread between the Bolivian Treasury Bill rate and the US federal funds rate reflects country risk. Episodes of political instability occurring during the sample period coincide with increases in the spread. The empirical analysis includes the International Country Risk Guide country risk indicator as a control variable, but results are robust to the inclusion of the spread as well.

¹⁰ We translate all Bolivian peso amounts into US dollars at the prevailing exchange rate. We report nominal US dollars but include both US and Bolivian inflation rates in all specifications. The mean annualized monthly US inflation rate for the loans in the sample equals 2.62 %.

More liquid assets, $(Liquid\ Assets / Assets)_{\tau-1}$, and less foreign financing (and therefore less monitoring), $(Foreign\ Funds / Assets)_{\tau-1}$, may allow banks to indulge in risk-taking. This effect may be reinforced by monetary conditions (an issue we address later by introducing interactions). The mean and median of both ratios equal around ten percent.

We also include the leverage ratio, $(Equity / Assets)_{\tau-1}$, and the ratio of loans to total assets, $(Loans / Assets)_{\tau-1}$, to control for the effect that a bank's financial and asset structure might affect risk management. Finally, a backlog of non-performing loans may also temper a bank's appetite for more risk; hence, we also include the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, $(NPL / Assets)_{\tau-1}$. On average almost eight percent of the loan volume is non-performing, with substantial variation across banks and time.

For *firm characteristics* we include three dummy variables to control for the firm's legal structure and eighteen industry dummies to capture possible differences in loan demand. Using the information in the Register we also compute a firm's total outstanding bank debt, $Bank\ Debt_{\tau-1}$, in millions of US dollars as a measure of firm leverage and riskiness. The average (median) firm borrows around 1.85 (0.47) millions of US dollars in bank loans. Unfortunately, we cannot match the loans with firm accounting information to provide additional controls since for confidentiality reasons the borrower's identities have been altered before the data were given to us. Hence, to control for possible unobserved firm heterogeneity we introduce firm fixed effects in a set of corresponding linear regressions.

As the database contains the universe of Bolivian bank loans we can construct three indicators of *bank-firm relationship* characteristics. $Multiple\ Banks_{\tau-1}$ equals one if the firm has outstanding loans with more than one bank, and equals zero otherwise; $Main\ Bank_{\tau-1}$ equals one if the value of loans from a bank is at least 50% of the firm's loans, and equals

zero otherwise; and, $Scope_{\tau-1}$ equals one if the firm has additional products (i.e., used or unused credit cards, used or unused overdrafts, and discount documents) with the bank, and equals zero otherwise. While more than half of the loans are taken by firms that have multiple bank relationships, almost three quarters of these firms borrow at least 50% from one bank.¹¹ Only 25% of the loans are obtained jointly with additional bank products.

4. *Loan Characteristics*

For *loan characteristics* we include $Amount_{\tau}$, $Interest\ Rate_{\tau}$, $Collateral_{\tau}$, $Maturity_{\tau}$, and $Loan\ Type_{\tau}$. Most loans are small to medium-sized. The average and median loan equals 170,000 US dollars and 50,000 US dollars, respectively, but have a high loan rate of around 14%; well above the average federal funds rate of 4%. Only 27% of loans are collateralized. The median loan maturity is twelve months, while the median time to default or repayment is four months. Defaults and early repayments explain the difference between the loan maturity and the length of a loan spell (i.e., the time between τ and $\tau + T$). To keep our estimated results more easily interpretable, we ignore early repayment behavior captured in competing risk models as lenders may have foresight about early repayment. Finally, 71% of the loans are installment loans, while the remaining 29% of the loans are single-payment loans.

It is crucial to understand the role loan conditions play in our regressions. If banks correctly assess the risk on the individual when they originate the loan and adjust the loan conditions fully to “price it in”, then including these loan conditions in our specifications should not leave any room for monetary conditions to explain the hazard rate, unless changes in monetary conditions directly modify banks’ appetite for risk.

¹¹ These statistics are provided per loan. Only around one-fifth of our sample firms have multiple bank relationships and there is a positive correlation between firm size and the number of relationships. This pattern is consistent with findings from other countries (Ongena and Smith (2000)). See also Guiso and Minetti (2005) and Ongena, Tümer-Alkan and von Westernhagen (2007) on borrower concentration.

5. Banking Market and Macroeconomic Conditions

To capture *banking market characteristics* we use the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration, $HHI_{\tau-1}$, which is equal to the sum of the squared bank shares of outstanding loans, calculated per month for each region. The mean HHI equals 0.18, comparable to levels for the United States and other countries (see, for example, Table 1 in Degryse and Ongena (2008)). We also include twelve region dummies to capture other possible structural differences in the banking markets and regions at large.

We include four variables to control for changes in *macroeconomic conditions* at loan origination and during the life of the loan. The growth rate in the real gross domestic product in Bolivia, $\Delta GDP\ Bolivia_{\tau-1+t}$, is included to control for variations in the demand for bank loans over the Bolivian business cycle. The average growth rate during the sample period was 1.87%,¹² varying between 0.42% and 3.60%. We further include the US and the Bolivian inflation rates, $Inflation\ US_{\tau-1+t}$ and $Inflation\ Bolivia_{\tau-1+t}$, respectively. Both inflation rates are calculated using the corresponding consumer price indexes. During the sample period, the average Bolivian inflation rate was 2.72%, slightly higher than the average US inflation rate of 2.62%, though with more than double variation.

We also control for changes in country risk, using the composite country risk indicator from the International Country Risk Guide published by the PRS Group, $Country\ Risk_{\tau-1+t}$. This indicator is available on a monthly frequency and encompasses three types of risk: political, financial, and economic. According to the Guide, a value of zero indicates high risk, while a value between 80 and 100 indicates very low risk. During the sample period, the country risk of Bolivia varied between 65 and 70. Finally, we include 11 month dummies to absorb

¹² All statistics in Table 1 are computed by loan. The mean growth rate by month equals 2.04%, slightly higher as the number of outstanding loans and the growth rate are not perfectly correlated.

any seasonality in bank activity and a deposit insurance dummy that equals one once deposit insurance is introduced (Ioannidou and Penas (2009)).

IV. Results

A. Time-Varying Duration Model

1. Estimated Coefficients

We start with the maximum likelihood estimation of the proportional hazard model using the Weibull distribution as the baseline hazard rate (in unreported exercises we also assess log-logistic and semi-parametric Cox specifications but results are unaltered). We report the estimated coefficients, standard errors and significance levels in Table 2. Model I features only the US federal funds rate in the month prior to the loan origination, i.e., the variable $Federal\ Funds_{\tau-1}$. Model II also includes the time-varying changes of the US federal funds rate after loan origination until default or repayment, $Federal\ Funds_{\tau+t}$.¹³ This model is our benchmark specification on the basis of which we will make most of our further assessments and calculations.

[Insert Table 2 here]

The coefficients of $Federal\ Funds_{\tau-1}$ in Models I and II are negative, statistically significant, and equal to -0.137^{**} and -0.150^{***} respectively.¹⁴ The coefficient of the $Federal\ Funds_{\tau+t}$ in Model II, instead, is positive and significant at the 5% level and equals

¹³ We also employ the federal funds rate as an instrument for the Bolivian interbank rate. We run first stage regressions with and without controlling for macro conditions either at the individual loan-level or at the year-month level. Using the US federal funds rate as instrument for the Bolivian interbank rate yields results that are very similar to those reported in Table 2. Interestingly, using the Bolivian interbank rates directly, without instrumentation, yields statistically insignificant coefficients for the interbank rate.

¹⁴ As in the tables, we use stars next to the coefficients to indicate their significance levels: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.

0.195**. In Model III we use the monthly changes in the federal funds rate over the lifetime of the loan, $\Delta \text{Federal Funds}_{\tau+t}$, instead of the level. The results, however, are very similar.

This is one of our main findings. A decrease in the US federal funds rate, which under the exchange rate regime renders monetary conditions in Bolivia more expansionary, corresponds to a higher hazard rate on *new loans*, but a lower hazard rate on *outstanding loans*. Hence expansionary monetary policy seems to encourage the initiation of riskier loans, but diminishes the hazard rate on outstanding bank loans! This finding is in line with the results in Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2008) for Spain. In this paper we go a step further and also study the pricing of this risk-taking under different monetary conditions.

Before turning to an economic assessment and a deeper interpretation of the estimated coefficients on the federal funds rate, we briefly review the estimated coefficients on the other (control) variables across all specifications. Most of these coefficients are fairly stable in magnitude and statistical significance throughout most specifications.

Large banks grant more risky loans, as do banks that have more loans on their books.¹⁵ Banks with stronger balance sheets in terms of liquidity and capital take loans with higher credit risk. Banks with a higher rate of non-performance in their loan portfolio continue to issue more risky loans, though the estimated coefficient is not always statistically significant. Banks with higher foreign financing, $(\text{Foreign Funds}/\text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$, not surprisingly in many specifications take loans with lower credit risk, though the coefficient is not always statistically significant. Firms with more debt, also not surprisingly, are more likely to repay.

¹⁵ Replacing this variable with bank loan growth or dropping all bank characteristics leaves results unaltered.

The loan rate, collateral, and maturity are also relevant for the ensuing hazard rate. *Ceteris paribus*, loans with higher loan rates, secured loans,¹⁶ or loans with shorter maturities, have a higher hazard rate, suggesting that banks adjust loan conditions when they take on more risk. The coefficients on the *Federal Funds* _{$\tau-1$} , however, suggest that these adjustments do not account fully for the extra risk they are taking when interest rates are low.

Banks in less concentrated markets grant loans with a higher hazard rate, possibly because more intense competition lowers lending standards by reducing bank charter value (Keeley (1990)). Higher inflation in Bolivia corresponds to a lower hazard rate (possibly because it reduces the real level of debt), while higher inflation in the US corresponds to a higher hazard rate (which implies that for a given nominal exchange an increase in the real exchange rate increases the hazard rate). The coefficients on the growth rate of real GDP and the ICRG Country Risk measure are mostly positive and statistically significant.¹⁷

Results are robust to the additions of: (1) the growth rate of US real GDP, (2) the total amount of loans granted to Bolivia by BIS countries (which includes the United States), (3) the exchange rate between Bolivian peso and US dollar, (4) the one-year US Treasury Bill rate, (5) the ten-year US Government Bond rate, and (6) the yield curve defined as the spread between the ten-year US Government Bond rate and the one-year US Treasury Bill rate. All interest rates and spreads are introduced either at origination, or at origination and over the

¹⁶ Replacing our collateral dummy variable with the loan-to-value ratio (equal to the estimated market value of the collateralized assets at the time of the loan origination to the loan amount) leaves results unaltered. However, because of weak creditor rights in Bolivia collateral values may not be that informative and indeed are often higher than the amounts banks are able to recover in the event of bankruptcy. The incidence of collateral in our sample is comparable to reports from Belgium for example (26 % in Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000)), but much lower than the incidence reported in the US Small Business Survey (53% in Berger and Udell (1995)), which is possibly indicative of the substantial difficulties in seizing and liquidating pledged assets in Bolivia.

¹⁷ Results are robust to the replacement of the country risk measure by its three components (economic and political country risk matter more than financial country risk).

life of the loan. Results are further robust to splitting the sample period in two almost equal halves in December 2001; the month deposit insurance was introduced.

2. *Paths of Monetary Policy and Bank Risk-taking*

Before turning to alternative *ex ante* measures of risk, we investigate the economic relevancy of the estimated coefficients on the federal funds variables. We analyze how different “paths of monetary policy” (i.e., different combinations of $Federal\ Funds_{\tau-1}$ and $Federal\ Funds_{\tau+t}$) affect the estimated hazard rate. Employing the coefficients of Model II in Table 2, we calculate an annualized hazard rate for a loan with a twelve months spell,¹⁸ but otherwise mean characteristics, for various different combinations of $Federal\ Funds_{\tau-1}$ and $Federal\ Funds_{\tau+t}$. Figure 3 displays some of these combinations.

[Insert Figure 3 here]

For example, if the federal funds rate is equal to its sample mean throughout the loan’s life, the annualized estimated hazard rate is 1.84%. In sharp contrast, if the federal funds rate is equal to its sample minimum (1.01%) at origination, but increases to its sample maximum (6.54%) at maturity, the loan hazard rate more than doubles to 4.98%, a high percentage. On the other hand, if the “path is reversed” and the funds rate drops from its maximum to its minimum, the hazard rate more than halves to 0.72%. Keeping the funds rate steady at half a percent results in hazard rates similar to the “path connecting the means”, 1.63% and 2.50% respectively.¹⁹ Figure 4 plots the convex contour of the estimated hazard rate for all combinations of funds rates between zero and seven percent.

¹⁸ The choice of twelve months matters because the estimated parameter of duration dependence, $\hat{\alpha}$, is larger than one. As we annualize the hazard rate, this choice facilitates interpretation and does not qualitatively alter the results.

¹⁹ Findings in Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2008) are very similar not only qualitatively but also quantitatively. If throughout the loan’s life the overnight rate is equal to its mean in their sample, the

[Insert Figure 4 here]

The estimated effects of the federal funds rate on loan hazard rates are economically relevant and in accordance with recent conjectures. During long periods of low interest rates banks may take on more risk and relax lending standards. These estimates suggest that exposing the “hazardous” cohort of loans, granted when rates were low, to swiftly increasing policy rates dramatically exacerbates their “toxicity”. But while suggestive of the impact of changes in monetary policy on the loan hazard rates, the estimates so far are really only calculated for one loan cohort at a time. To obtain a comprehensive assessment of a monetary policy path on the aggregate hazard rate, cohort size and timing needs to be properly accounted for (since, for example, loans granted during the period of the increase in the federal fund rate will have a lower hazard rate).

3. *Bank Characteristics*

While controlling for an array of factors, the estimates could still result from a relative increase in the demand for credit from riskier borrowers (though a lower interest rate actually decreases the demand from risky borrowers in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). Models IV to VII in Table 2 aim to further identify the source of the changes in the hazard rate by interacting the federal funds rate with bank asset liquidity and borrowing from foreign financial institutions, i.e., the variables $(Liquid\ Assets / Assets)_{t-1}$ and $(Foreign\ Funds / Assets)_{t-1}$.²⁰

The estimates in Models IV to VII in Table 2 broadly confirm these priors, though not all the coefficients are statistically significant. In unreported specifications we also include

annualized estimated hazard is equal to 0.55%. If the overnight rate is equal to its sample minimum (2.02%) at origination, but increases to its sample maximum (9.61%) at maturity, the loan hazard increases to 3.85%. Instead, if the “path is reversed” and the funds rate drops from its maximum to its minimum, the hazard rate decreases to 0.14%.

²⁰ The ordinarily reported standard errors (and marginal effects) of interacted variables in non-linear models may require corrections (Ai and Norton (2003), Norton, Wang and Ai (2004)). However, Models VI and VII in Table 3 are linear and confirm most results.

interactions with $\text{Log}(\text{Assets})_{t-1}$, $(\text{Equity}/\text{Assets})_{t-1}$, and $(\text{NPL}/\text{Assets})_{t-1}$. Larger banks and banks with a lower capital ratio or higher ratio of non-performing loans take more risks when the funds rate is lower. We also introduce interactions with HHI_{t-1} ,²¹ but the estimated coefficients are not significant. We further drop the interactions with the funds rate over the life of the loan in all exercises (as the theory is sharper about the implications for the interactions with the federal funds rate prior to origination) and the bank fixed effects (as in Kashyap and Stein (2000)). Results, however, are unaffected.

4. Ex Ante Measures of Risk

As mentioned earlier, one concern about using *ex post* non-performance information to estimate the *ex ante* risk-taking is that the banks never intended to take these risks and were just caught off guard during difficult times. While we use time-varying controls in duration models to account for this, there is always the possibility of omitted variables. Hence, to further address this concern we use three *ex ante* measures of risk that were all directly available to banks when making their loan decisions. A dummy Current NPL_{t-1} that equals one if any of the borrower's outstanding loans in the month prior to the loan initiation is non-performing, and equals zero otherwise. A dummy $\text{Past Default}_{t-1}$ that equals one if in the month prior to the loan initiation the borrower has a prior default (i.e., if it has ever defaulted on a loan in the past) and equals zero otherwise. Both of these past repayment problems are observable to all banks through the credit registry.²² And a dummy Subprime_t that equals one if the bank's own internal credit rating indicated that at the time of loan origination the

²¹ With more banking competition, proxied by a lower Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, banks have more incentives to take risk because their franchise value is lower (Keeley (1990)). Thus, with easy access to liquidity during monetary expansions, a very competitive environment for banks may enhance risk taking (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006)).

²² Ioannidou and Ongena (2009) provide a detailed description of the information sharing regime in place.

borrower had financial weaknesses that rendered the loan repayment doubtful (i.e., had a rating equal to 3 or higher), and equals zero otherwise. Results are tabulated in Table 3.²³

[Insert Table 3 here]

We find that lower funds rate prior to loan origination implies that banks give more loans to borrowers with present (Model I) or past defaults (Model II) and to borrowers with subprime credit scores (Model III). In unreported specifications we also distinguish whether the overdue payments on outstanding loans are on loans from the *same* or *another* bank. Giving new loans to borrowers with current, but temporary financial difficulties might be the only way banks can recover their initial loans and does not necessary constitute (additional) risk-taking. We find that when the federal funds rate is low, banks are more likely to originate loans to both groups of borrowers, but that the effect is much larger for borrowers with problems in other banks (32% as opposed to 21%), consistent with our interpretation that banks engage in more risk-taking when the federal funds rate is low.

In unreported specifications we also add the change in the federal funds rate over the life of the loan in these three models, assuming foresight on the part of the banks. The estimated coefficients on this variable are not statistically nor economically significant, while the coefficients on $FederalFunds_{t-1}$ retain their significance. Hence, banks do not seem to take into account the expected future developments in the federal funds rate when taking more risk at initiation.

Like in the hazard models we also add interactions of the federal funds rate at the time of the loan origination with bank liquidity, foreign funds, bank size, capital, non-performing loans and market concentration. Overall, non-reported regressions show that more liquid,

²³ The number of loans employed for the estimation of Models I-III varies because the binary dependent variable in the dropped cases is perfectly predicted by bank identity, firm type, industry and/or region or some combination of these variables.

larger and less-capitalized banks with non-performing loans and operating in more competitive markets tend to lend to risky borrowers when the federal funds rate is low.

5. *Firm Fixed (Demand) Effects*

Firm characteristics may capture important changes in loan demand but our models feature too few of them. Technical estimation constraints prevent us from introducing the 2,726 firm effects in a time-varying duration model; hence, we transform the duration model into a simple linear specification. We define the dependent variable to equal the actual time to default, in months, or in case of repayment to equal twice the length of the maximum time to repayment during the sample period, which is equal to 96 months.²⁴

In Model IV we report specifications featuring only the federal funds rate in the month prior to origination, $Federal\ Funds_{\tau-1}$, while in Model V we also include the change in the federal funds rate between origination and repayment or default, $\Delta Federal\ Funds_{\tau+T}$.²⁵ In Models VI and VII we include interactions of the $Federal\ Funds_{\tau-1}$ and $\Delta Federal\ Funds_{\tau+T}$ with bank characteristics variables $(Liquid\ Assets/Assets)_{\tau-1}$ and $(Foreign\ Funds/Assets)_{\tau-1}$. Despite the presence of 1,880 firm fixed effects,²⁶ the results are virtually unaffected across the board. Except for the interaction between $Federal\ Funds_{\tau-1}$ and $(Liquid\ Assets/Assets)_{\tau-1}$, as the estimated coefficients on the two interactions with the liquidity ratio are small compared to the estimated coefficients on the federal funds rate.

²⁴ This transformation broadly aligns the linear model with a duration model that controls for right censoring and allows for more efficient use of the available information (i.e., the time to default).

²⁵ In a linear setting the time series correlation between the funds rate in levels at origination and at maturity creates strong multicollinearity. We therefore resort to using the changes of the federal funds rate.

²⁶ Industry and firm type dummies are still included as these dummies are actually loan specific and numerous firms are in multiple industries (in which case loan industry is indicative of its purpose) or switch industry and/or type over the sample period.

Firm fixed effects control for firm specific risk that is constant over the sample period. This suggests that when the federal funds rate is low, banks do not simply start financing risky firms that were excluded otherwise, but also engage in funding riskier projects (i.e., firms that would only have obtained loans for their safer projects when rates were high are able to obtain financing for their riskier projects when rates are low).

B. Pricing of Risk

1. *Main Result*

We now turn to the second main step of our analysis, the investigation of the pricing of risk, to more deeply analyze whether banks, and not firms, are the drivers of our findings. Moreover, banks may take more risk, but they may also price it and/or adjust other loan conditions. Our results so far suggest that banks do not adjust loan conditions fully, as we include the four key loan conditions (amount, rate, collateral, and maturity) in our specifications, but that the federal funds rate variables explain the hazard rates nevertheless.²⁷

As we can not know in what combinations these four (but also other secondary) conditions will be adjusted to compensate for the changes in risk, we focus on the loan rate as the most salient loan condition. We investigate how loan rates reflect the different components of the hazard rate. In particular, we examine whether the component of the hazard rate that is explained by the monetary policy rate at loan origination and the remaining hazard rate (explained by all the other factors) are priced similarly.

For each individual loan we first calculate, using the estimates of Model II in Table 2, a hazard rate in the month prior to the loan origination at the *median* value of the federal funds

²⁷ We cannot include loan conditions over the life of the loan, as loan conditions may not be ancillary. An ancillary variable has a stochastic path that is not influenced by the duration of the spell. Loan conditions are mostly fixed at origination. But when adjusted (in the case of collateral for example) this will most likely occur in response to changes in the time to default of the loan.

rate over the sample. We are interested in having an equal probability of a federal funds rate increase or decrease and for expositional purposes, we call this variable the neutral hazard rate, *Neutral Hazard Rate _{τ}* , considering monetary conditions “neutral” if the federal funds rate is equal to its sample median. We take the actual values for all other independent variables, except for the loan rate which we also fix to its median. As the loan rate will be the dependent variable now, employing an actual loan rate would obviously result in a spurious correlation. Using its median value appropriately scales the hazard rate, facilitating the economic assessment of the estimated coefficients.

Next, we calculate the hazard rate at the *actual* value of the funds rate in the month prior to the loan origination, *Federal Funds _{$\tau-1$}* . We label the difference between this hazard rate and the *Neutral Hazard Rate _{τ}* , the Δ *Neutral Hazard Rate _{τ}* . This variable captures changes in the hazard rate caused by deviations of *Federal Funds _{$\tau-1$}* from its median or “neutral” position. Positive deviations correspond to higher hazard rates that result from expansionary monetary conditions at origination in Model II (Table 2).

The question we try to address: “is the banks’ appetite for risk increasing when funds rates are low such that banks grant loans with higher credit risk without adjusting the loan rates fully?” To answer this question we regress the actual loan rate, in percent, on the *Neutral Hazard Rate _{τ}* and the Δ *Neutral Hazard Rate _{τ}* . We include the monthly average London Interbank Offered Rate, *LIBOR _{τ}* , and a constant to control for interest rate levels. The *LIBOR _{τ}* is the rate on US dollar denominated loans matched in maturity with the time to repayment or default of the individual bank loans. We have access to LIBOR rates for loans

with a maximum maturity of twelve months. Hence, we use a sub-sample of 23,412 loans with spells up to one year.²⁸ The OLS estimates are reported in Table 4.

[Insert Table 4 here]

The coefficient on the constant in Model I in Table 4 suggests that the spread between loan rate and the $LIBOR_t$ equals around 11%. As expected from previous studies, the loan rate adjusts sluggishly to changes in the $LIBOR_t$.²⁹ More importantly for our purposes, the coefficient on the *Neutral Hazard Rate_t* indicates that a one percent increase in the hazard rate leads to a 3.7% increase in the loan rate.³⁰

If monetary conditions before origination shift from neutral to “expansionary”, i.e., if the *Federal Funds_{t-1}* decreases from its median so that the $\Delta \text{Neutral Hazard Rate}_t$ turns positive, the banks will actually charge less on average. The estimated negative coefficient is equal to -4.138^* , which is smaller than the estimated positive coefficient of the *Neutral Hazard Rate_t*, that equals $+3.708^{***}$. These differential coefficients suggest that the component of the hazard rate that is explained by monetary policy rates has even a negative effect on the loan rate, while the remaining part of the hazard rate (explained by all the other factors) has a positive impact on the loan rate. This is not consistent with loan demand driving our results. Our findings also suggest that ceteris paribus banks do not seem to require extra compensation for the risk taken during expansionary monetary times.

²⁸ Hazard rates are calculated on the basis of the coefficients estimated using all loans.

²⁹ The change in the loan rate due to a basis point change in the $LIBOR_t$ equals 0.6^{***} in Model I. This coefficient suggests sluggishness in loan rate adjustments, possibly due to the implicit interest rate insurance offered by banks (e.g., Berlin and Mester (1998)), credit rationing (e.g., Fried and Howitt (1980) and Berger and Udell (1992)), or the downward drift in Bolivian interest rates during our sample period. The size of the coefficient on a comparable variable, i.e., the interest rate on a government security with equal maturity in Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Degryse and Ongena (2005) is around 0.3^{***} and 0.5^{***} , respectively.

2. Interactions and Ex Ante Measures of Risk

Models II and III include interactions of $\Delta \text{Neutral Hazard Rate}_\tau$ with $(\text{Liquid Assets} / \text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$ and $(\text{Foreign Funds} / \text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$, respectively. We find that banks with more liquidity, hence banks that are less constrained, price the increment in the hazard rate even less sharply than banks that are more constrained. The opposite is true for banks with more foreign financing, possibly because foreign institutions monitor more.

In unreported specifications, we also include interactions with $\text{Log}(\text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$, $(\text{Equity} / \text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$, and $(\text{NPL} / \text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$. We find that larger banks, banks with a lower capital ratio, and higher non-performing loans price the increment in the hazard rate less sharply (these banks also take more risk).

Finally, we study the pricing to borrowers with present (Model IV) or past defaults (Model V) and to borrowers with subprime credit scores (Model VI). In each case we use the models from Table 3, i.e., Models I-III, to calculate the part of the probability of engaging the high-risk borrower that is attributable to changes in the federal funds rate. As before, we label this part the $\Delta \text{Neutral Rate}_\tau$, and regress the actual loan rate on this variable, the Neutral Rate_τ (also similarly defined as before), the LIBOR_τ , and a constant.

The results are similar to those found using the hazard rate estimates. In particular, the estimated coefficients on $\Delta \text{Neutral Rate}_\tau$ (i.e., -0.847 and -11.637^{***}) are in both cases smaller than the estimated coefficients on Neutral Rate_τ (i.e., 6.592^{***} and 32.611^{***}). The engagement of subprime borrowers due to funds rate changes, on the other hand, seems almost properly priced: the estimated coefficients on $\Delta \text{Neutral Rate}_\tau$ and Neutral Rate_τ are

³⁰ If the LIBOR_τ is equal to two percent for example and for neutral monetary conditions, a hazard rate of zero percent results in a loan rate of 12.0%, while a hazard rate of two percent corresponds to a loan rate of

almost equal (i.e., 12.470*** and 14.034***). Of course, any ex-ante measure may fail to predict the actual loan performance and hence pricing may still be inadequate (as suggested by Model I).

V. Conclusion

We analyze the impact of monetary policy on bank loan risk-taking by accessing the detailed credit register of Bolivia from 1999 to 2003. During this period, the Bolivian peso was pegged to the US dollar, there were hardly any restrictions in the Bolivian capital account, and the banking system was almost completely dollarized. In addition, the Bolivian business cycle and the US federal funds rate were not correlated. The US federal funds rate is therefore a proper measure of the so predetermined stance of monetary policy in Bolivia and is exogenous to the local economic conditions. Hence, employing the US federal funds rate we can examine whether and how monetary policy rates affect banks' risk-taking.

We find that lower monetary policy rates increase the risk-appetite of banks. Controlling for bank, firm, relationship, loan, market, macroeconomic and country-risk characteristics, a decrease in the US federal funds rate prior to loan origination raises the hazard rate on the individual bank loans (in pointed contrast, a decrease in the federal funds rate over the life of the loan lowers the hazard rate). Originating loans with a subprime credit rating or loans to riskier borrowers with current or past non-performance also becomes more likely when the federal funds rate is low. Results also suggest that banks do not price this additional risk they take. We further find that larger banks, with less capital, more liquid assets, and fewer funds from foreign financial institutions take more risk when rates are low and seem to price this additional risk even less than other banks.

19.4% (i.e., $19.4 - 12.0 = 7.4\%$).

All in all, our findings suggest that when monetary policy rates are low banks take more risk. This increase in risk-taking is more pronounced for banks with more acute moral hazard problems establishing a possible link from low policy rates to excessive risk-taking.

TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

The table defines the variables employed in the empirical specifications and provides their mean, standard deviation, minimum, median and maximum. Subscripts indicate the time of measurement of each variable. τ is the month the loan was granted. Variables that vary over time have a subscript $\tau+t$. The number of loan – month observations equals 156,808 and the number of loan observations equals 27,007. The timing of the variables is similar to the empirical models: $\tau-1$ is the month prior to the month the loan was granted and t is during the life of the loan.

Variables	Definition	Unit	Mean	St.Dev.	Min.	Med.	Max.
<i>Dependent Variables</i>							
Time to Loan Default or Repayment	Time to loan default or repayment	months	6.29	6.10	1	4	52
Current NPL	= 1 if any of the borrower's outstanding loans in the month prior to the loan initiation is non-performing; = 0 otherwise	0/1	0.05	0.22	0	0	1
Past Default	= 1 if in the month prior to the loan initiation the borrower has a prior loan default (i.e., if it has ever defaulted on a loan in the past); = 0 otherwise	0/1	0.00	0.04	0	0	1
Subprime	= 1 if the bank's own internal credit rating indicated that at the time of loan origination the borrower had financial weaknesses that rendered the loan repayment doubtful and, therefore, was subprime (i.e., had a rating equal to 3 or higher); = 0 otherwise	0/1	0.03	0.17	0	0	1
<i>Monetary Conditions</i>							
Federal Funds _{$\tau-1$}	US federal funds rate in the month prior to loan origination	%	4.28	1.81	1.01	4.81	6.54
Federal Funds _{$\tau+t$}	US federal funds rate during the life of the loan until default of repayment	%	4.03	2.12	1.01	4.99	6.54
<i>Bank Characteristics</i>							
Includes 13 Bank Dummies							
$\ln(\text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$	The log of total bank assets	mln. US\$	6.27	0.73	2.79	6.43	7.27
$(\text{Liquid Assets}/\text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$	Ratio of bank liquid assets over total assets	%	12.61	6.51	1.43	11.06	49.08
$(\text{Foreign Funds}/\text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$	Ratio of financing by foreign institutions over total assets	%	10.50	8.11	0	9.05	46.43
$(\text{Equity}/\text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$	Ratio of bank equity over total assets	%	10.37	4.33	5.34	9.28	54.22
$(\text{Loans}/\text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$	Ratio of bank loans over total assets	%	71.01	6.73	9.91	71.16	86.16
$(\text{Non-Performing Loans}/\text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$	Ratio of non-performing bank loans over total assets	%	7.70	4.58	0.60	6.17	41.60
<i>Firm Characteristics</i>							
Includes 18 Industry Dummies and 2,725 Firm Effects							
Bank Borrowing _{$\tau-1$}	The firm's total outstanding bank loans	mln. US\$	1.85	3.58	0.00	0.47	45.11
Sole Proprietorship	= 1 if the firm is a sole proprietorship; = 0 otherwise	0/1	0.13	0.33	0	0	1
Partnership	= 1 if the firm is a partnership; = 0 otherwise	0/1	0.14	0.34	0	0	1
Corporation	= 1 if the firm is a corporation; = 0 otherwise	0/1	0.71	0.45	0	1	1
Other	= 1 if the firm is a public company, a municipality, or a cultural, sport, or religious association; = 0 otherwise	0/1	0.02	0.14	0	0	1
<i>Bank - Firm Relationship Characteristics</i>							
Multiple Banks _{$\tau-1$}	= 1 if the firm has outstanding loans with more than one bank; = 0 otherwise	0/1	0.54	0.50	0	1	1
Main Bank _{$\tau-1$}	= 1 if the value of loans from a bank is at least 50% of the firm's loans; = 0 otherwise	0/1	0.72	0.45	0	1	1
Scope _{$\tau-1$}	= 1 if the firm has additional products (i.e., credit card used or not used, overdraft used or not used, and discount documents) with a bank; = 0 otherwise	0/1	0.25	0.43	0	0	1
<i>Loan Characteristics</i>							
Amount _{τ}	Loan amount at origination	mln. US\$	0.17	0.49	0.00	0.05	12.21
Interest Rate _{τ}	annual contractual interest rate at origination	%	13.96	2.64	0.16	14.5	35
Collateral _{τ}	= 1 if loan is collateralized at origination; = 0 otherwise	0/1	0.27	0.45	0	0	1
Maturity _{τ}	Loan maturity at origination	months	20.00	22.58	0	11.83	180.43
Installment _{τ}	= 1 if loan is an installment loan; = 0 if a single-payment loan	0/1	0.71	0.45	0	1	1
<i>Banking Market Characteristics</i>							
Includes 12 Region Dummies							
Herfindahl Hirschman Index _{$\tau-1$}	The sum of squared bank shares of outstanding loans calculated per month for each region	-	0.18	0.11	0.12	0.16	1
<i>Macro Conditions</i>							
Includes 11 Month and Deposit Insurance Dummies							
Δ GDP Bolivia _{$\tau-1$}	Growth in the gross domestic product in Bolivia	%	1.87	0.80	0.42	2.04	3.60
Inflation US _{$\tau-1$}	Monthly change in the US consumer price index	%	2.62	0.74	1.07	2.65	3.70
Inflation Bolivia _{$\tau-1$}	Monthly change in the Bolivian consumer price index	%	2.72	1.66	-1.23	2.71	6.42
ICRG Country Risk Measure _{$\tau-1$}	= 100 if low risk; = 0 if high risk. Composite country risk indicator encompassing political, financial, and economic risk	-	67.49	1.13	64.80	67.50	69.80

TABLE 2. EX POST MEASURES OF RISK-TAKING: TIME-VARYING DURATION MODELS

The estimates this table lists are based on ML estimation of the proportional hazard model using the Weibull distribution as the baseline hazard rate. The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1. The number of loan – month observations equals 156,808. The number of loan observations equals 27,007. Subscripts indicate the time of measurement of each variable. τ is the month the loan was granted. Variables that vary over time have a subscript that includes t . All estimates are adjusted for right censoring. Coefficients are listed in the first column and the standard errors are reported between brackets in the second column. Significance levels are listed in the third column. For the estimated parameter of duration dependence the difference from one is tested. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Independent Variables	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
<i>Monetary Conditions</i>							
Federal Funds _{$\tau-1$}	-0.137 [0.056] **	-0.150 [0.057] ***	-0.133 [0.057] **	0.127 [0.124]	-0.212 [0.073] ***	0.017 [0.124]	-0.256 [0.069] ***
Federal Funds _{$\tau+t$}		0.195 [0.092] **		0.066 [0.106]	0.151 [0.120]		
Δ Federal Funds _{$\tau+t$}			1.056 [0.417] **			-0.273 [0.699]	0.415 [0.693]
<i>Monetary Conditions and Bank Characteristics</i>							
Federal Funds _{$\tau-1$} * (Liquid Assets/Assets) _{$\tau-1$}				-0.018 [0.007] **		-0.009 [0.007]	
Federal Funds _{$\tau-1$} * (Foreign Funds/Assets) _{$\tau-1$}					0.017 [0.008] **		0.021 [0.008] ***
Federal Funds _{$\tau+t$} * (Liquid Assets/Assets) _{$\tau-1$}				0.013 [0.005] ***			
Federal Funds _{$\tau+t$} * (Foreign Funds/Assets) _{$\tau-1$}					0.005 [0.004]		
Δ Federal Funds _{$\tau+t$} * (Liquid Assets/Assets) _{$\tau-1$}						0.105 [0.053] **	
Δ Federal Funds _{$\tau+t$} * (Foreign Funds/Assets) _{$\tau-1$}							0.053 [0.042]
<i>Bank Characteristics</i>							
$\ln(\text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$	2.861 [0.604] ***	2.897 [0.606] ***	2.872 [0.605] ***	2.985 [0.623] ***	3.033 [0.591] ***	3.058 [0.611] ***	3.058 [0.587] ***
(Liquid Assets/Assets) _{$\tau-1$}	0.050 [0.025] **	0.047 [0.025] *	0.049 [0.025] *	0.090 [0.035] **	0.048 [0.025] *	0.094 [0.035] ***	0.054 [0.025] **
Foreign Funds/Assets _{$\tau-1$}	0.013 [0.010]	0.007 [0.011]	0.009 [0.010]	-0.002 [0.012]	-0.084 [0.034] **	0.001 [0.012]	-0.079 [0.035] **
(Equity/Assets) _{$\tau-1$}	0.158 [0.035] ***	0.163 [0.036] ***	0.159 [0.035] ***	0.142 [0.036] ***	0.176 [0.031] ***	0.135 [0.035] ***	0.170 [0.031] ***
(Loans/Assets) _{$\tau-1$}	0.082 [0.027] ***	0.073 [0.027] ***	0.076 [0.027] ***	0.089 [0.028] ***	0.076 [0.028] ***	0.082 [0.027] ***	0.086 [0.028] ***
(Non-Performing Loans/Assets) _{$\tau-1$}	0.025 [0.022]	0.040 [0.023] *	0.035 [0.022]	0.066 [0.028] **	0.076 [0.028] ***	0.060 [0.026] **	0.067 [0.027] **
Individual Bank (13) Dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

<i>Firm Characteristics</i>							
Bank Borrowing _{t-1}	-0.186 [0.054] ***	-0.183 [0.054] ***	-0.186 [0.054] ***	-0.189 [0.054] ***	-0.185 [0.054] ***	-0.187 [0.054] ***	-0.190 [0.054] ***
Legal Structure (3) and Industry (18) Dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
<i>Bank - Firm Relationship Characteristics</i>							
Multiple Banks _{t-1}	0.039 [0.158]	0.030 [0.157]	0.037 [0.158]	0.024 [0.155]	0.041 [0.156]	0.026 [0.156]	0.050 [0.157]
Main Bank _{t-1}	-0.291 [0.179]	-0.279 [0.179]	-0.293 [0.179]	-0.266 [0.179]	-0.242 [0.180]	-0.282 [0.178]	-0.258 [0.180]
Scope _{t-1}	0.451 [0.129] ***	0.453 [0.129] ***	0.451 [0.129] ***	0.475 [0.128] ***	0.457 [0.129] ***	0.466 [0.129] ***	0.447 [0.129] ***
<i>Loan Characteristics</i>							
Amount _t	0.279 [0.179]	0.257 [0.184]	0.269 [0.182]	0.284 [0.169] *	0.281 [0.177]	0.272 [0.174]	0.296 [0.172] *
Rate _t	0.332 [0.035] ***	0.332 [0.035] ***	0.333 [0.035] ***	0.327 [0.036] ***	0.338 [0.036] ***	0.333 [0.035] ***	0.336 [0.036] ***
Collateral _t	0.763 [0.165] ***	0.774 [0.163] ***	0.763 [0.164] ***	0.792 [0.165] ***	0.759 [0.166] ***	0.780 [0.165] ***	0.754 [0.166] ***
Maturity _t	-0.058 [0.008] ***	-0.057 [0.009] ***	-0.058 [0.008] ***	-0.058 [0.009] ***	-0.057 [0.009] ***	-0.058 [0.008] ***	-0.057 [0.008] ***
Installment _t	-0.038 [0.177]	-0.085 [0.180]	-0.054 [0.179]	-0.090 [0.181]	-0.097 [0.181]	-0.069 [0.177]	-0.050 [0.179]
<i>Banking Market Characteristics</i>							
Herfindahl Hirschman Index _{t-1}	-6.999 [2.376] ***	-7.183 [2.350] ***	-6.883 [2.346] ***	-7.082 [2.382] ***	-7.207 [2.332] ***	-6.694 [2.348] ***	-6.895 [2.331] ***
Region (12) Dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
<i>Macro Conditions</i>							
Δ GDP Bolivia _{t-1+t}	0.247 [0.140] *	0.194 [0.147]	0.332 [0.147] **	0.157 [0.151]	0.165 [0.149]	0.314 [0.149] **	0.321 [0.149] **
Inflation US _{t-1+t}	0.358 [0.186] *	0.393 [0.188] **	0.441 [0.187] **	0.357 [0.191] *	0.374 [0.189] **	0.434 [0.189] **	0.427 [0.188] **
Inflation Bolivia _{t-1+t}	-0.224 [0.055] ***	-0.304 [0.064] ***	-0.300 [0.066] ***	-0.307 [0.065] ***	-0.315 [0.065] ***	-0.291 [0.067] ***	-0.302 [0.066] ***
ICRG Country Risk Measure _{t-1+t}	0.148 [0.089] *	0.121 [0.093]	0.228 [0.101] **	0.089 [0.096]	0.111 [0.095]	0.204 [0.102] **	0.234 [0.102] **
Month (11) and Deposit Insurance Dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Constant	-47.03 [7.327] ***	-45.62 [7.477] ***	-52.35 [8.250] ***	-46.06 [7.685] ***	-46.21 [7.354] ***	-53.07 [8.302] ***	-54.74 [8.203] ***
Estimated Parameter of Duration Dependence (α)	2.440 [0.107] ***	2.556 [0.135] ***	2.534 [0.118] ***	2.639 [0.151] ***	2.614 [0.138] ***	2.557 [0.120] ***	2.586 [0.120] ***
Estimated Log-Pseudolikelihood and Wald Chi2(78)	-968 9,306 ***	-965 9,274 ***	-960 9,687 ***	-961 9,368 ***	-960 8,713 ***	-954 10,002 ***	-965 9,474 ***

TABLE 3. EX ANTE MEASURES OF RISK-TAKING: PROBIT AND OLS MODELS

The estimates this table lists are based on probit (Models I to IV) and OLS (Models V to VIII) estimations. The dependent variables are: a dummy $Current\ NPL_{\tau-1}$ that equals one if any of the borrower's outstanding loans in the month prior to the loan initiation is non-performing, and equals zero otherwise; A dummy $Past\ Default_{\tau-1}$ that equals one if in the month prior to the loan initiation the borrower has a prior loan default (i.e., if it has ever defaulted on a loan in the past) and equals zero otherwise; And a dummy $Subprime_{\tau}$ that equals one if the bank's own internal credit rating indicated that at the time of loan origination the borrower had financial weaknesses that rendered the loan repayment doubtful and, therefore, was subprime (i.e., had a rating equal to 3 or higher) and equals zero otherwise. $Time\ to\ Default_{\tau}$ equals the actual time to default or in case of repayment set equal to 96, in months. The definition of the other variables can be found in Table 1. The number of loan observations is indicated in the Table. Subscripts indicate the time of measurement of each variable. τ is the month the loan is granted. $\tau+T$ is the month the loan is repaid or defaults. Coefficients are listed in the first column and the standard errors are reported between brackets in the second column. Significance levels are listed in the third column. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Independent Variables	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Model Dependent Variable	Probit Current NPL	Probit Past Default	Probit Subprime	OLS Time to Default	OLS Time to Default	OLS Time to Default	OLS Time to Default
<i>Monetary Conditions</i>							
Federal Funds $_{\tau-1}$	-0.092 [0.025] ***	-0.145 [0.064] **	-0.059 [0.030] **	0.204 [0.107] *	0.341 [0.107] ***	0.850 [0.154] ***	0.501 [0.110] ***
Δ Federal Funds $_{\tau+T}$					-1.101 [0.126] ***	-1.471 [0.244] ***	-0.283 [0.187]
<i>Monetary Conditions and Bank Characteristics</i>							
Federal Funds $_{\tau-1}$ * (Liquid Assets/Assets) $_{\tau-1}$						-0.037 [0.006] ***	
Federal Funds $_{\tau-1}$ * (Foreign Funds/Assets) $_{\tau-1}$							-0.038 [0.007] ***
Δ Federal Funds $_{\tau+T}$ * (Liquid Assets/Assets) $_{\tau-1}$						0.031 [0.017] *	
Δ Federal Funds $_{\tau+T}$ * (Foreign Funds/Assets) $_{\tau-1}$							-0.075 [0.017] ***
<i>Bank Characteristics</i>							
$\ln(\text{Assets})_{\tau-1}$	0.508 [0.195] ***	-0.522 [0.915]	0.031 [0.175]	1.350 [0.722] *	1.563 [0.716] **	2.822 [0.779] ***	0.499 [0.732]
(Liquid Assets/Assets) $_{\tau-1}$	-0.013 [0.006] **	-0.046 [0.021] **	-0.002 [0.008]	0.008 [0.019]	-0.012 [0.019]	0.101 [0.030] ***	0.012 [0.019]
Foreign Funds/Assets) $_{\tau-1}$	0.019 [0.004] ***	0.003 [0.021]	-0.004 [0.005]	-0.108 [0.025] ***	-0.160 [0.025] ***	-0.181 [0.027] ***	0.089 [0.046] *
(Equity/Assets) $_{\tau-1}$	0.037 [0.010] ***	0.026 [0.056]	-0.011 [0.011]	-0.072 [0.045]	-0.118 [0.044] ***	-0.141 [0.044] ***	-0.132 [0.044] ***
(Loans/Assets) $_{\tau-1}$	0.015 [0.006] ***	0.006 [0.021]	0.002 [0.010]	-0.056 [0.022] ***	-0.101 [0.021] ***	-0.097 [0.021] ***	-0.097 [0.020] ***
(Non-Performing Loans/Assets) $_{\tau-1}$	-0.001 [0.008]	0.004 [0.036]	0.037 [0.008] ***	-0.346 [0.036] ***	-0.273 [0.036] ***	-0.221 [0.036] ***	-0.346 [0.038] ***
Individual Bank (13) Dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

<i>Firm Characteristics</i>							
Bank Borrowing _{t-1}	0.008 [0.004] **	-0.165 [0.038] ***	-0.005 [0.005]	0.103 [0.029] ***	0.096 [0.029] ***	0.095 [0.029] ***	0.095 [0.029] ***
Legal Structure (3) and Industry (18) Dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Firm (2,726) Fixed Effects				Included	Included	Included	Included
<i>Bank - Firm Relationship Characteristics</i>							
Multiple Banks _{t-1}	0.785 [0.042] ***	-0.353 [0.165] **	-0.002 [0.047]	0.409 [0.240] *	0.339 [0.241]	0.347 [0.241]	0.324 [0.241]
Main Bank _{t-1}	-0.250 [0.034] ***	-0.578 [0.176] ***	-0.255 [0.048] ***	0.524 [0.181] ***	0.450 [0.181] **	0.473 [0.181] ***	0.390 [0.180] **
Scope _{t-1}	0.474 [0.030] ***	0.216 [0.098] **	0.198 [0.037] ***	-0.533 [0.185] ***	-0.556 [0.184] ***	-0.547 [0.184] ***	-0.508 [0.184] ***
<i>Loan Characteristics</i>							
Amount _t	0.003 [0.039]	0.313 [0.063] ***	0.185 [0.028] ***	0.028 [0.142]	0.004 [0.142]	0.028 [0.144]	0.040 [0.144]
Rate _t	0.178 [0.010] ***	0.115 [0.021] ***	0.206 [0.012] ***	-0.573 [0.056] ***	-0.561 [0.056] ***	-0.548 [0.056] ***	-0.569 [0.056] ***
Collateral _t	0.216 [0.037] ***	0.331 [0.126] ***	0.136 [0.044] ***	-1.178 [0.222] ***	-1.116 [0.221] ***	-1.094 [0.220] ***	-1.101 [0.219] ***
Maturity _t	0.004 [0.001] ***	0.006 [0.002] ***	0.010 [0.001] ***	0.003 [0.007]	0.016 [0.007] **	0.015 [0.007] **	0.015 [0.007] **
Installment _t	-0.138 [0.032] ***	-0.041 [0.094]	-0.187 [0.040] ***	-0.854 [0.177] ***	-0.770 [0.175] ***	-0.779 [0.175] ***	-0.858 [0.176] ***
<i>Banking Market Characteristics</i>							
Herfindahl Hirschman Index _{t-1}	-3.950 [0.538] ***	-3.777 [1.988] *	-7.052 [0.858] ***	9.370 [2.533] ***	8.781 [2.515] ***	8.825 [2.502] ***	9.275 [2.508] ***
Region (12) Dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
<i>Macro Conditions</i>							
Δ GDP Bolivia _{t-1}	0.033 [0.020] *	-0.162 [0.072] **	-0.059 [0.027] **	0.217 [0.079] ***	0.403 [0.083] ***	0.423 [0.083] ***	0.371 [0.083] ***
Inflation US _{t-1}	-0.042 [0.039]	-0.021 [0.111]	0.119 [0.046] ***	-1.356 [0.166] ***	-0.970 [0.168] ***	-0.964 [0.168] ***	-0.667 [0.167] ***
Inflation Bolivia _{t-1}	0.034 [0.021]	0.070 [0.059]	0.008 [0.022]	0.172 [0.070] **	0.164 [0.070] **	0.115 [0.071]	0.204 [0.071] ***
ICRG Country Risk Measure _{t-1}	-0.067 [0.019] ***	-0.032 [0.059]	0.019 [0.023]	-0.122 [0.073] *	0.047 [0.074]	0.086 [0.074]	0.075 [0.073]
Month (11) and Deposit Insurance Dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Constant	-4.02 [1.971] **	3.68 [8.036]	-5.68 [2.178] ***	107.42 [8.105] ***	96.18 [8.143] ***	83.06 [8.489] ***	99.44 [8.191] ***
Estimated Log-Pseudolikelihood and Wald Chi2(78)	-5,054 1,925 ***	-339 573 ***	-3,244 1,336 ***				
Estimated Adjusted R-squared				47.3%	47.7%	47.8%	48.0%
Number of Loan Observations	29,831	17,871	29,368	29,900	29,900	29,900	29,900

TABLE 4. PRICING OF RISK-TAKING

The estimates this table lists are based on OLS estimation. The dependent variable is the actual loan rate, in percent. The *Neutral Hazard Rate* _{τ} used in models I to III is calculated on the basis of the coefficient estimates of Model II in Table 2 at the *median* value of the federal funds rate in the month prior to origination (as the loan rate is the dependent variable we set it equal to its median value as well); all other independent variables are set equal to their actual values. The Δ *Neutral Hazard Rate* _{τ} used in Models I to III is the difference between the hazard rate at the *actual* value of the federal funds rate in the month prior to origination and the *Neutral Hazard Rate* _{τ} . The *Neutral Rate* _{τ} and Δ *Neutral Rate* _{τ} used in Models IV to VI, are similarly calculated on the basis of the coefficient estimates of Models I to III in Table 3. The *LIBOR* _{t, τ} is the average monthly London Interbank Offered Rate in US dollars and matched in maturity to the bank loan (loans with a maturity longer than one year are matched to the one year LIBOR). The definition of the other variables can be found in Table 1. The number of observations equals 23,412 (as loans with a maturity longer than one year are dropped), 28,699, 17,434 and 28,234, respectively. Subscripts indicate the time of measurement of each variable. τ is the month the loan was granted. Coefficients are listed in the first column and the standard errors are reported between brackets in the second column. Significance levels are listed in the third column. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Independent Variables	I	II	III
Neutral Hazard Rate _{τ}	3.708 [1.635] **	3.138 [1.551] **	3.691 [1.638] **
Δ Neutral Hazard Rate _{τ}	-4.138 [2.193] *	17.785 [4.014] ***	-5.962 [2.300] ***
Δ Neutral Hazard Rate _{τ} * (Liquid Assets/Assets) _{$\tau-1$}		-0.691 [0.103] ***	
Δ Neutral Hazard Rate _{τ} * (Foreign Funds/Assets) _{$\tau-1$}			0.322 [0.126] **
LIBOR _{τ}	0.624 [0.009] ***	0.646 [0.009] ***	0.624 [0.009] ***
Constant	10.785 [0.043] ***	10.675 [0.046] ***	10.789 [0.043] ***
Number of Loan Observations	23,412	23,412	23,412

Independent Variables	IV Current NPL	V Past Default	VI Subprime
<i>Rate</i>			
Neutral $Rate_{\tau}$	6.592 [0.114] ***	32.611 [1.163] ***	14.034 [0.213] ***
Δ Neutral $Rate_{\tau}$	-0.847 [1.543]	-11.637 [1.793] ***	12.470 [2.690] ***
LIBOR $_{\tau}$	0.483 [0.059] ***	0.170 [0.073] **	0.904 [0.056] ***
Constant	10.965 [0.768] ***	16.357 [0.890] ***	3.874 [1.349] ***
Number of Loan Observations	28,699	17,434	28,248

FIGURE 1. THE TIMING OF THE MONETARY POLICY VARIABLES IN THE TIME-VARYING DURATION ANALYSIS

The figure clarifies the timing of the monetary policy variables within the context of the time-varying duration analysis.




FIGURE 2. THE US FEDERAL FUNDS RATE, BOLIVIAN INTEREST RATES AND THE GROWTH IN BOLIVIAN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

The figure displays monthly values of the US federal funds rate, the Bolivian savings deposit rate, the Bolivian Treasury bill rate, the Bolivian interbank rate and the growth in Bolivian gross domestic product.




FIGURE 3. MONETARY POLICY PATHS AND LOAN HAZARD RATE

The figure displays various paths for the Federal Funds rate (in%) and the resulting annualized Loan Hazard Rate (in%) calculated for a loan with a maturity of twelve months but otherwise mean characteristics, based on the coefficients of Model II in Table 2.





FIGURE 4. FEDERAL FUNDS RATES BEFORE LOAN ORIGINATION AND UNTIL MATURITY (ONE YEAR) AND THE LOAN HAZARD RATE

The figure displays the *Federal Funds* _{$\tau-1$} , in the month before the loan origination date $\tau-1$, on the left horizontal axis, the *Federal Funds* _{$\tau+t$} , until maturity $\tau + t$, on the right horizontal axis, and the resulting annualized loan Hazard rate calculated for a loan with a maturity of twelve months but otherwise mean characteristics on the vertical axis. All variables are displayed in percent.



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